Cream Finance suffered a 130M USD hack in October 2021. Detailed Analysis: https://mudit.blog/cream-hack-analysis/

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Description

The attack stem from a sudden price manipulation of a supported asset (yUSDVault) in the protocol. The attacker built up leveraged positions and then manipulated the price of the asset by donating the underlying into the yUSDVault.

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Solution

One possible solution is to check price deviations from touched assets in the protocol during the transaction. This would avoid flashloan price manipulation attacks. 
function assertion_priceDeviation() public view {
    PhEvm.Logs[] memory logs = PhEvm.getLogs();
    bytes32[] memory topics = [
        CTokenInterface.Redeem.selector,
        CTokenInterface.Borrow.selector,
        CTokenInterface.RepayBorrow.selector,
        CTokenInterface.LiquidateBorrow.selector
    ];


    address[] memory touchedAssets = new address[];
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < logs.length; i++) {

        if(logs[i].topics[0] == CTokenInterface.Mint.selector) {
            touchedAssets.push(getAssetFromMintLog(logs[i]));
            continue;
        }
        if(logs[i].topics[0] == CTokenInterface.Redeem.selector) {
            touchedAssets.push(getAssetFromRedeemLog(logs[i]));
            continue;
        }
        if(logs[i].topics[0] == CTokenInterface.Borrow.selector) {
            touchedAssets.push(getAssetFromBorrowLog(logs[i]));
            continue;
        }
        if(logs[i].topics[0] == CTokenInterface.RepayBorrow.selector) {
            touchedAssets.push(getAssetFromRepayBorrowLog(logs[i]));
            continue;
        }

    }

    uint256[] memory postPrices = new uint256[](touchedAssets);
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < touchedAssets.length; i++) {
        postPrices.push(priceOracle.getPrice(touchedAssets[i]));
    }

    ph.forkPreState();

    for (uint256 i = 0; i < touchedAssets.length; i++) {
        uint256 prePrice = priceOracle.getPrice(touchedAssets[i]);
        require(
            postPrice[i] < prePrice * (1 + MAX_DEVIATION_FACTOR) &&
            postPrice[i] > prePrice * (1 - MAX_DEVIATION_FACTOR),
            "Price deviation too high"
            );
}