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What Happened

Verichains’ October 2025 analysis describes a cook action sequence in which an additional action replaced the accumulated status and cleared the flag requesting a final solvency check. An action sequence such as [5, 0] therefore matters for its resulting debt and collateral, not just for whether an individual action looked valid. Verichains incident analysis.

Attack Mechanism

cook() executes a sequence of actions and carries a CookStatus flag telling it whether to run a final solvency check. Borrow action 5 set that flag. An additional action 0 replaced the accumulated status with a new struct whose flag was false. The sequence [5, 0] therefore had a harmful composition: borrow created debt, then the next action erased the instruction to check it. Looking at either action alone would miss why the combined operation bypassed the check. The assertion ignores the internal flag and evaluates the caller’s position at the end of every cook call. It converts debt shares through totalBorrow, rounds debt up, converts BentoBox collateral shares to token amounts, and applies the collateralization ratio. Cauldron’s exchange rate is collateral per MIM, so multiplying collateral by that rate would invert the valuation. For each caller with debt, the permitted collateral amount must cover the debt valued at that rate. Iterating all calls avoids the previous fragment’s mistake of checking only the first caller in a transaction.

Assertion Example

What This Check Covers

This targets the Cauldron/BentoBox getter layout shown. A fork that assigns debt to another account needs account discovery for that account. The stored exchange rate is still a trust dependency; independent oracle freshness and debt-rebase consistency are additional policies. Checked arithmetic fails closed on overflow; test the supported value ranges.